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Making Strategy Critical?  
 
It is hard to argue against the claim that strategy is one of the most ubiquitous and 
consequential organizational practices of modern times. The language and practices of 
strategy emanating from the corporate boardroom, consultancy firms and business schools 
have permeated all facets of society. Schools, hospitals, charities, sports teams, political 
parties, social movement organizations and religious organizations all have opted for, or been 
coerced into, using the tools, techniques and logics of strategic management. To fail to be 
‘strategic’ seems to be regarded as a modern-day sin: tantamount to being incompetent, 
unprofessional and anachronistic. Yet the importing of corporate strategy language and 
practice has also transformed the way in which these organizations operate. Activities, 
identities and values are no longer allowed if they do not speak to the pursuit of the holy grail 
of the strategic “vision” and “mission”. The commercial logic of strategy, in many cases, 
trumps all others. It has the tendency of writing out other possibilities for organizations, such 
as the pursuit of broader community-based objectives. 
The strategies pursued in the corporate sector have also transformed modern society and 
their effects have been felt by every citizen around the world. Strategies of globalisation have 
shifted the production of goods and services in ways that can make or break nation-states 
and the livelihoods of their citizens. Strategies of monopoly power pursued by big 
corporations have crushed smaller, local providers and transformed the economic landscape. 
Global corporations often have more power than nation-states and do not seem to be shy 
from flexing their muscles in their ‘non-market’ strategies of political influence. Strategies of 
neo-liberalism have transformed public services into markets to be exploited and have 
transformed citizens into consumers. Strategies of ‘financial innovation’ in the banking sector 
have left the world still reverberating from the aftermath of the global financial crisis. To say 
that strategy matters is clearly an understatement. All stakeholders live with the 
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consequences of strategies that have been implemented. With hindsight, some are visionary, 
while others are at best misadventures.  
Yet the way that strategy is currently conceptualised, and taught in classrooms around the 
world, is a curious thing. As a subject, strategy is dominated by the field of industrial 
economics. Through this disciplinary window, strategies are devised and enacted through 
rational economic calculations: the scanning of market opportunities, calculations about the 
economic payoffs of different courses of action and judgements about the likely outcomes of 
competitive moves and counter-moves. Admittedly, it is something of a ‘straw man’ to invoke 
a caricature of contemporary strategic theory and economics as a discipline more broadly. 
Certainly, some attempts have been made to bring in the ‘human’ and ‘political’ dimension 
of strategic action: social networks, cognitive bias in top management teams, differences in 
logics generated by national business systems or institutional fields, and so on. But it is this 
starting point in economics that still seems to lead theorists to view the “stuff” of the social 
world as an aberration to the ideal-type model of rational calculations. The ‘social’ is 
conceptualised as either something to be eliminated (or at least contained) if it detracts from 
the process of rational calculation or something to be exploited in the case of reputation or 
social networks. In so doing, the field of strategy still seems to be missing an awful lot of 
“stuff” in its current state of the art. This missing “stuff” not only limits its development as a 
‘pure’ science that can understand the phenomenon in question but also its development as 
an ‘applied’ and ‘critical’ science that can help those we teach to learn not only how to 
execute it on a technical level but also how to articulate ways of evaluating how it is done, 
and how it could be done differently, from the perspective of society as a whole not just the 
corporate elite.  
What is this “stuff” of the social world? And why does it matter for the development of our 
understanding of strategy? This “stuff” refers to the things that serve both to ‘bind together’ 
groups of people and groups of organisations (the ‘glue’ if you like) and the things that can 
drive them apart (the ‘wedge’ to continue the metaphor). These social groups could be as 
small as a team of senior managers or as large as the groups of organizations that form 
networks and alliances or the groups of organizations that interact within an industry or 
nation-state. This social “stuff” includes all kinds of things that are constitutive of the social 
realm: social norms, rules, values, roles, identities, beliefs, discourses, symbols, meaning-
systems, systems of domination, power relations and ideologies. Taking this social stuff 
seriously means moving away from understanding strategies as merely the outcome of sets 
of rational economic calculations. The way that strategies emerge and gain or lose their 
legitimacy are instead viewed as rooted in this social “stuff”: shared understandings of what 
is normal and abnormal, what the ‘rules of the game’ are, what is right and wrong, who should 
‘properly’ do what, understanding of who we are and what we can and cannot (or should and 
should not) do, beliefs about what exists and how the world works, ways of representing the 
world through language and other symbolic means, dominant systems of thought that 
structure how we come to see ourselves and the world around us, and the power relations 
and ideologies that generate and legitimate systems of advantage and disadvantage. It is this 
social “stuff” that is behind forms of coordination and cooperation as well as forms of division, 
conflict and inequality that arise from strategies pursued by organizations.  
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Importantly, this social “stuff” is also not politically neutral and inert, a purely “ideational” 
realm” that is divorced from the material world. This social “stuff” from which strategies 
emerge is constitutive of, and consequential for, the material world. A deregulated banking 
sector and the strategies of risk-taking and risk-distribution which emerged from it, grounded 
in the belief in the ‘trickle down’ benefits of free markets, resulted in a global financial crisis 
which was then responded to as merely an ‘aberration’ in the neo-liberal ideology that 
created it (Clegg et al, 2011; Cooper, 2015; Elliot and Atkinson, 2009). From within this 
discourse and ideology of neo-liberalism, the societal response was not to question the 
foundations of the neo-liberal economic system that created the crisis but instead a bail-out 
to be paid for with tax-payers money and followed by a period of austerity, affecting the lives 
of millions around the globe (Kelsey et al, 2017). The social “stuff” from which strategies 
emerge could not be more consequential for those involved in their creation and those still 
today feeling their impact. Strategy is therefore not just about scanning competitive 
environments and calculating payoffs from courses of action. It is a practice that is enmeshed 
in power and structured by forms of domination, inequality and exploitation. Thus, if we want 
to ‘bring society back in’ to the study of strategy, we will also need new ways of understanding 
this social “stuff” other than as an external ‘stakeholder’ to be factored in to the strategy 
calculation.  
In this special issue, we propose that our understanding of strategy, in a field still dominated 
by the discipline of economics, is significantly limited by its lack of engagement with theory 
that can explain strategy as a social and political practice. We are mindful of the words of Sir 
Lawrence Freedman in his book, Strategy: A History, when he argues that strategy is “about 
getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art 
of creating power” (Freedman, 2013: xii). Strategy works on the promise that the future can 
not only be known, it can be also dominated and controlled. The strategic plan can be created 
and the competitive moves can be calculated, but the plans and moves can also be brought 
into being by bending the world to the will of those who created them. Our aim in this special 
issue is therefore to bring insights from sociology, philosophy, cultural theory and politics to 
illuminate one of the most important practices of modern times: the doing of strategy. 
 
Strategic Thought: A Potted History 
Given the range and prominence of strategy it should hardly come as a surprise that there are 
many approaches to studying it. Contributions from economics, history, military warfare, 
international relations, organization theory, public administration, social movement studies 
and strategy-as-practice make for a diverse archipelago of strategic thought. The different 
islands of the archipelago do not share a lingua franca and consequently view strategy in very 
different ways: from the rational actor of economic theory to the commander-general of 
military planning through to strategy-as-practice’s focus on the somewhat more mundane 
and less exotic everyday management practices.  
For close to three decades, scholarship on strategy in the Business School world divorced itself 
from broader developments in strategic thought. This was, in our view, a serious mistake. In 
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place of a multi-paradigmatic discussion on the nature of strategy, what emerged was a 
narrow window comprising of two panes: market-based Porterian approaches and the more 
organizationally grounded resource-based view (RBV). Using a metaphor from North 
American politics, the ‘Overton Window’ (Beck, 2010) refers to political debate taking place 
within a narrow window where discussion is confined to safe issues (cf. Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962). Porterian and RBV perspectives retained an iron grip on strategy debates. As any MBA 
student will point out, you are either “with” Porter or the RBV. Both panes of the Overton 
Window claimed to be able to pin point the ‘holy grail’ of strategic thought: the source of 
sustainable competitive advantage. Occasionally, Henry Mintzberg – or another heterodox 
strategist - would score a direct hit with his catapult, cracking part of the window. This would 
be greeted as an opening up of strategy, only for Academy of Management and Strategic 
Management Society glaziers to swiftly reinforce the glass. During this period, aside from 
incursions by writers such as Mintzberg, strategy was implicitly or explicitly grounded in its 
origins in industrial economics.  
There have, however, been some initially promising movements. In February 2001, a group 
of organization theorists and strategy scholars convened at an EIASM workshop in Brussels 
(Carter et al, 2008; Clegg et al., 2004). In broad terms, the meeting comprised of the old guard 
of processual strategists from Europe, some institutional scholars and a new generation of 
organization theorists. Out of this event, the nascent strategy-as-practice movement 
emerged. In the decade and a half that has followed, strategy-as-practice has institutionalised 
itself as a major position in strategy, especially in Europe. Arguably, this has been 
accomplished through the construction of a ‘big tent’, incorporating well-established 
processual scholars together with a newer generation of academics, perhaps best 
characterised as organization theorists who were interested in strategy processes. Big tents 
in academia, as in politics, tend to have a light ideological base to them, which can be a source 
of weakness as well as strength.  The strategy pursued by the strategy-as-practice school itself 
is a fascinating story that is yet to be written. After a broadly incoherent start, the approach 
developed a momentum, constructed a very wide network and has generated substantial 
amounts of symbolic and cultural capital, in the form of elite chair positions and publications 
in high prestige journals.   
Has strategy-as-practice shattered or extended the ‘Overton window’? Has it in fact created 
its own window? Does it constitute a breakthrough in strategy thought? For all of strategy-
as-practice’s activity and scholarship, the ascendancy of industrial economics remains firmly 
in-tact. This speaks to the institutional power of institutional economics manifested in its 
control of the central apparatus of the discipline of strategic management. Equally, it is a 
result of the political quietism that undergirds the strategy-as-practice movement, which 
pursued a strategy of compromise and quiet diplomacy with the strategy mainstream. It was 
not unusual for strategy-as-practice writers to go as far as seeking to link strategy-as-practice 
with prevailing economics approaches (Jarbkowski, 2004; Johnson et al., 2003). Strategy-as-
practice claimed it could provide a more realistic picture of the kinds of strategy work 
undertaken by corporate leaders and middle managers, revealing the mundane and messy 
realities of managerial practice that lay behind the neat and simplistic rationalities of the 2 x 
2 matrix. In other words, strategy-as-practice did not seek to challenge directly the 
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underpinnings and assumptions of mainstream strategy theory. Whereas proponents of the 
RBV or of Porter busied themselves with abstractions of inimical resources or market 
structures, strategy-as-practistas headed to the board-room, meeting room or corporate 
away-day and watched and listened. The approach did not seek academic confrontations, 
such as the debates that took place between Keynesians and their neo-classical rivals, or the 
pugilistic arguments that took place between Foucaultians and their Marxist opponents in 
labour process conferences in the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, there was no scientific 
revolution, nor was there a dialectical process. While its impact on mainstream strategy is 
limited, it is beyond dispute that strategy-as-practice has carved out a space for itself within 
the academy field of strategy. This is most evident in its presence at the Academy of 
Management, with the Strategic Management Society and publications in high prestige 
journals. As a perspective, strategy-as-practice has gained acceptance from within the 
mainstream; as a community, it has continued to grow.    
 
Returning  to the archipelago metaphor, the strategy-as-practice island has been busy trading 
with other islands and in so doing gaining a reputation as a strategic entrepôt: building links 
with mainstream strategy (Regner, 2008), institutional theory (Suddaby et al, 2013), 
narratology (Brown and Thompson, 2013; Fenton and Langley, 2011), critical discourse 
analysis (Mantere & Vaara, 2008), routines (Hendry & Seidl, 2003; Jarzabkowski, 2004), 
information systems (Whittington, 2014), boundary objects (Spee and Jarzbkwoski, 2008), 
performativity (Kornberger and Clegg, 2011), socio-materiality (Balogun et al, 2012; 
Jarzbkowski et al., 2013) and accounting (Chapman et al, 2015 ; Boedker, 2010; Kornberger 
and Carter, 2010). The breadth of connections that strategy-as-practice has forged is quite 
staggering; importing and then blending these ideas into new conceptual ideas about strategy 
practice (Oswick et al., 2011). As with mainstream strategy, strategy-as-practice’s limited 
engagement with practitioners is striking. This throws up a strategy-as-practice paradox: an 
approach that seeks to describe and analyse strategy practices struggles to communicate back 
to the practitioner community.  
 
The connections made by strategy-as-practice have tended to be with debates going on 
elsewhere in organization and management theory. At the time of writing, the field has not 
yet engaged in these debates with international relations, war studies or social movement 
studies, for instance. Criticisms of strategy-as-practice have been voiced from its earliest days. 
The charge-sheet is that it promotes an overly managerialist agenda (Carter et al, 2008a; 
McCabe 2009); has paid insufficient attention to power and politics (Ezzamel and Willmott, 
2004, 2008, 2010); ignores vocabularies of strategy beyond the firm (McKinlay and Pezet, 
2017); makes spurious connections with mainstream strategic concepts (Carter et al, 2008b); 
lacks an epistemological understanding (Chia and MacKay, 2007); is ahistorical (Carter et al, 




Few attending the workshop in Brussels in 2001 could have possibly imagined the impact that 
strategy-as-practice would achieve as a movement. Whereas a decade ago comparisons to 
‘pushy younger siblings’ (Whittington, 2007) or ‘punk rockers’ (Carter et. al, 2008b) seemed 
apposite, strategy-as-practice is now an influential body of strategic thought. This 
achievement is as impressive as it is puzzling. It raises serious questions about the future of 
strategy-as-practice: What will strategy-as-practice look like in a decade’s time? Will it 
continue to be in thrall to the mainstream establishment of the US-dominated Academy of 
Management? What does it aim to do: add an organizational side-show to the dominant 
economic paradigm or fundamentally rethink how strategy is conceptualised, practiced and 
taught? If the former is the aim, is this a useful endeavour? If it wants to do the latter, how 
can that be achieved? Will it engage with major societal issues or prefer to confine itself to 
relatively trivial issues? These questions are not lost on the leading lights of the strategy-as-
practice community, who are quick to respond to critiques (Jarzbkowski and Whittington, 
2008), challenges (Golsorkhi, et al, 2010), and in doing so have developed a much more 
definite view of practice (Jarzbkowski et al, 2016) than was present a decade ago (Carter et 
al, 2008b). Equally, scholars are aware of the need to think through the future of strategy-as-
practice (Vaara and Whittington, 2012) and its intellectual foundations (Seidl and 
Whittington, 2014).  
If we were to summarise the impact of the strategy-as-practice community to date, counting 
among its achievements are: (i) it has created a space for the sociological consideration of 
strategy; (ii) as a position, it has gained ‘legitimacy’ within mainstream management theory; 
(iii) it has linked to a wide variety of other social sciences literatures; (iv) it has reproduced 
itself successfully as a field. Applying a more sceptical perspective to strategy-as-practice, its 
limitations are: (i) the perspective is very broad, incorporating a wide of sometimes 
competing perspectives; (ii) while studying practice it rarely engages with practitioners, it is 
not clear on the practical implications it has so far for strategists ; (iii) despite this non-
engagement with practitioners, it implicitly takes on a managerialist agenda – rather than 
viewing strategy from the point of view of employees, unions, consumers or NGOs; (iv) it lacks 
a political or ethical agenda; (v) the perspective is broadly ahistorical; (vi) the perspective 
lapses into tautology, trying to explain success or failure in relation to practices.  
These strengths and weaknesses can perhaps be illustrated if we imagine studying the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS) in 2004, a few years before its collapse. The story of the collapse is 
well-known (Martin, 2013). RBS had grown from being a comparatively small Scottish bank 
that was focused on its home market of Scotland. In the 1990s this began to change. A new 
breed of senior executives gained control of RBS. Kerr and Robinson have characterised the 
shift as being from Scottish blue-bloods, drawn from the Establishment, to self-made neo-
liberal men and women. Dusty conservatism gave way to ambition and dynamism, under the 
leadership of its Chief Executive, Gordon Mathewson. This was signified by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland changing its name to signify a shift from Scottishness to its new role as a global 
player. This occurred at a time when the world economy was globalizing and the international 
money markets were awash with economic capital. In 1999-2000, RBS pulled off an audacious 
coup d’état by taking over the National Westminster Bank, its much larger competitor. The 
takeover was contested and involved competition between Edinburgh’s two major banks – 
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RBS and Bank of Scotland. This involved both companies seeking to gain the support of major 
shareholders. Lauded by the financial markets, this takeover elevated the standing of RBS in 
the City of London. The deal made Fred Goodwin’s reputation in the City of London, analysts 
were impressed by his grasp of detail and plans for growth as well as cost-cutting.  He 
succeeded Mathewson as Chief Executive in 2001. RBS now owned banks in North America, 
Ireland as well as the UK. Along with other UK banks, the early noughties were hugely 
profitable. For instance, in 2003, RBS posted pre-tax profits of £6.2 billion. As the Harvard 
Business Review said of the RBS executives, ‘They had a shared aspiration to make RBS not 
just a leading bank, but also one of the most widely admired companies in the world’. Much 
of the narrative around RBS at that time centred – almost inevitably – on Fred Goodwin. His 
aggression and unwillingness ‘to suffer fools gladly’ combined with his attention to detail 
were seen as virtues. For a time in 2007, RBS became the largest bank in the world, in terms 
of market capitalisation. The transformation from small, regional player to global giant 
seemed complete. Of course, in 2008 RBS was saved from collapse only following a massive 
intervention by the British government. Ten years on the bank is still troubled, with a range 
of difficult legacy issues to deal with.  
The question we would like to pose is: how would a strategy-as-practice study have handled 
RBS in its glory years? This is a counterfactual exercise, and could perhaps be dismissed as a 
rather meaningless parlour game. From our point of view, a strategy-as-practice study would 
have focussed on: Fred Goodwin and his managerial practices, such analysis might have 
approvingly picked up on his attention to detail; the strategy documents that were produced, 
many of which pointed to how well risk was being managed; the financial performance that 
pointed to remarkable success and was underpinned by financial innovation; and a culture 
oriented towards performance. Such a view would have been utterly credible. One can 
imagine an article on the ‘Lessons from Scotland’s Global Bank’. With what we know now, it 
would have been an entirely wrong-headed analysis. A superficial sociological analysis does 
little more than reproduce corporate fables. What is fairly clear from that period in RBS and 
the other banks that failed was that there was a normalisation of deviance, such that risky 
lending decisions that at one time would have been deeply problematic became ‘normalised’. 
This occurred in a climate where there was a lionisation of the executives of banks, to whom 
attributions of great powers and abilities were made. Embellishing these views, the media 
served up hagiographic accounts of banking executives, readily casting them as ‘wonders of 
the age’. These accounts were little more than instances of celebrity culture, rather than 
serious analysis of a fast-changing sector.  Along with central bankers – most notably Alan 
Greenspan - claims were made that the world economy had entered a new age, something 
that illustrated serious governance failures from regulators.  In part, regulators bought into 
the creation of the mythology that bankers were re-inventing the ‘laws of finance’, which 
became a widely held view within the financial establishment. Risk, for instance, it was held 
had been so widely shared, to the extent that it had been more or less eliminated, ignoring 
the performative dimensions of financial models. Similarly, the hubris of senior executives 
perpetuated the mythology of the banks and bankers obscuring the possibility that the 
unintended consequences of their strategies would destroy capital on an unprecedented 
scale.   This process of destruction highlighted the wide-reaching effects of a strategy gone 
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wrong: it was the State that rescued private enterprise, demonstrating the power of nation 
states to act, in the face of forty years of neo-liberal writing that downplayed the role of state 
action. Yet this re-embedding of banks into their communities came at a terrible price to those 
communities, as austerity measures were implemented by many countries in order to pay for 
the banking crisis, which had led to bail outs and the collapse of their tax base. At this very 
point, the prime victims of the banking crash became the recipients of welfare, while 
governments, who had rescued the banks, now found themselves scapegoated for profligacy, 
as if they had caused the crash in the first place. It is difficult to see how strategy-as-practice 
could have provided an analysis that would step out of its latent conservativism – and 
attendant tendencies towards hagiography and tautology - to provide compelling signs that 
would have spoken to the dangers the banks posed both to themselves and society. 
 
Strategy, Organizations and Society 
In September 2014, a group of scholars convened at the Strategy, Organizations and Society 
group at Newcastle University for a ‘24 hours on Strategy’ workshop. The event explored the 
social, cultural and political dimensions of strategy. The workshop involved presentations 
outlining insights from major social theorists, including Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, 
Garfinkel, Goffman, Weick and Zizek. The workshop’s objective was ambitious: it wanted to 
use insights from these theorists to ask new questions about strategy. If strategy had been a 
comparatively ‘closed’ discipline, largely disinterested in the broader currents running 
through social science, the workshop was an attempt to ‘open up’ strategy into a more 
interdisciplinary space. The presentations from the Newcastle workshop form the basis of this 
special issue. While some of these authors – such as Foucault (McKinlay and Pezet, 2018) and 
Weick (Brown, 2018) - are probably well known to writers on strategy, others – Deleuze and 
Guattari (Munro and Thanem, 2018), Garfinkel (Neyland and Whittle, 2018), Goffman 
(Mueller, 2018) and Zizek (Butler, 2018) –  are likely to be less familiar figures to strategy 
scholars. The objectives of this special issue are threefold: first, we introduce the 
aforementioned thinkers and discuss their implications for strategy; second, we outline the 
possibilities their work offers for the future development of strategic thought; third, we offer 
some reflections for the challenges facing strategy. The theorists showcased in this issue fall 
into two broad categories, North American social constructionists and symbolic 
interactionists – Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman and Karl Weick – and continental 
philosophy - Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault and Slavoj Zizek. The sets of 
writers represent some of the most important thinkers of the last sixty years; the central 
premise of this issue is that their ideas have far reaching ramifications for the study of 
strategy, which are explored here.    
Erving Goffman (1922-1982) 
Erving Goffman was one of the most important North American sociologists of the twentieth 
century. Goffman was one of the first to take the world of ordinary social interaction seriously. 
Up to this point, the discipline of sociology had tended to view face-to-face encounters in 
social settings as far too messy, idiosyncratic and disorganized to warrant any serious 
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attention. Interaction was regarded as merely a surface ‘babble’ that detracted from the 
‘proper’ focus of sociology on the so-called ‘macro’ social structures of the state, religion, 
education and the family. Goffman rejected this premise and showed that the world of social 
interaction was in fact highly structured and organized. A master of observation and 
categorisation, he was able to look closely at what happened when people interacted, or what 
he read in the newspaper, and see within the detail a pattern of expectations and 
understandings that constituted social reality. His most famous ethnographic studies include 
a study of a Shetland island community in Scotland and a study of a mental asylum. Goffman’s 
influence has been vast and his conceptual vocabulary has become part of the essential tool-
kit of social theorists today: the dramaturgical metaphor of social life as a ‘stage’ and the 
concepts of face, footing, role, rituals, stigma, and framing to name but a few.  
Frank Mueller asks: what has Erving Goffman got to teach us about strategy? In a detailed 
exegesis of Goffman’s work, Mueller points to the implications for how strategy performances 
are pulled off, particularly by executives and consultants. Mueller highlights that all strategies 
are created, and implemented, through performances of various kinds: interactions at board 
meetings and strategy away-days, interactions between CEOs and investors and analysts, 
speeches by strategy gurus, presentations by management consultants to corporate clients, 
and so on. This clearly has resonances with the Strategy- as-Practice field: Whittington (2007), 
for example, has pointed to the importance of studying the performance of strategy praxis 
(the actual activity involved in strategizing).  
Mueller reprises many of the key constructs of Goffmanian thought: the interaction order, 
front-stage/back-stage, footing, keying, fabrications. In this regard, Mueller takes us far 
beyond standard renditions of Goffman often found in the organization studies literature, 
which tend to draw primarily on the stage and performance metaphors. The paper 
demonstrates how the making of a strategy performance as ‘credible’ and ‘real’ is what leads 
to its performative consequences. It is the strategy ideas of those who have given a convincing 
performance that get brought into being. This is a crucial point: for instance, certain 
consultants are credited with ‘strategy expertise’ by their clients. Similarly, certain gurus are 
credited with ‘strategic ideas’ by their audience. It follows that certain managers or 
employees are credited with ‘strategic credibility’ by the CEO. In turn, certain CEOs are 
credited with ‘strategic competence’ by investors and analysts. And crucially, others are not.  
Politics does not enter the analysis through Goffman’s contributions to theories of power. As 
Mueller notes, Goffman openly acknowledged that he was not a power theorist. Rather, 
politics enters a Goffmanian analysis by following the strategy performances through to 
examine the ‘so what’ question. ‘So what’ that strategists have to pull off a credible 
performance? The fact that these ‘credible performers’ tend to be drawn from particular 
class, gender and educational backgrounds – as Mueller’s analysis of McKinsey suggests – 
serves to reproduce the organizational elites that dominate the strategy sphere. ‘So what’ 
that certain performers gain credence as strategists? The type of ‘tough’ and ‘macho’ 
performance of banking CEOs such as Fred Goodwin, or “Fred the Shred” as he was called, 
the now disgraced ex-CEO of Royal Bank of Scotland, was typical of the unquestioned high-
risk strategies of so many failed banks. Boards, consultants, regulators and analysts all failed 
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to question the risks being taken by their trading strategies and many colluded with them. ‘So 
what’ that we trust appearances when strategy performances seem credible? For six years 
running, Enron was named “America’s most innovative company” by Fortune magazine. We 
also trusted the auditors who signed off their books. Performances frame our sense of reality 
and provide us with unquestioning trust when they are ‘pulled off’ with credibility. ‘So what’ 
that strategy consultants peddle their wares in sometimes dubious ways? Assured by the 
rational calculations provided by their strategy consultant, organizations pursue their 
mergers and acquisitions, asset stripping, delayering and cost cutting strategies. Politics is 
right there at the heart of these performances. At stake is not only the bottom line but also 
impact on society as a whole.  
Harold Garfinkel (1917-2011) 
Harold Garfinkel was an American sociologist who followed Goffman’s footsteps into the 
world of everyday interaction but whose target of attack was squarely centred on the 
mainstream of functionalist sociology, most notably the work of his own teacher Talcott 
Parsons. Functionalism was the dominant paradigm in sociology at the time and started with 
the assumption that social facts – things such as social norms, values and rules – served as a 
kind of ‘glue’ that held society together and staved off social atrophy and conflict. Garfinkel’s 
challenge to functionalist sociology was to show how the social facts presumed to exist ‘out 
there’ in the social sphere were constituted by the common-sense social knowledge and 
reasoning of society’s members. Members of society were no longer the ‘cultural dopes’ 
being pushed and pulled by norms, values and rules presumed to exist in the functionalist’s 
version of society. Rather, ethnomethodology ‘re-specified’ these social facts as endogenous 
accomplishments of members of society, who were now understood as knowledgeable, artful 
and resourceful agents whose ‘methods’ constituted the social world that functionalists took 
as their starting point. It is perhaps no surprise that ethnomethodology was received badly 
by many mainstream sociologists and remains to this day a somewhat marginalised approach 
within sociology and the broader social sciences. The approach has more recently been 
reinvigorated through the work of Harvey Sacks and the blossoming of the field known as 
Conversation Analysis, with some using the term EM/CA to highlight the links between the 
two (Llewellyn & Hindmarsh, 2010).  
Daniel Neyland and Andrea Whittle take us through what an ethnomethodological approach, 
following Garfinkel, can illuminate in the study of strategy. Building on earlier 
ethnomethodological work by Samra-Fredericks in the Strategy as Practice field, they draw 
on a study of the development of a waste management strategy in a local authority to 
illustrate how attention to the ethno-methods of strategists helps us to understand how 
strategies are made – and with what consequences for society. Ethno-methods are the 
methods or procedures that people use to undertake common-sense reasoning and construct 
the ‘facts’ that strategists work with when they ‘do strategy’. Apparently simple and mundane 
actions, such as trying to make sense of the contents of a recycling box as part of a survey 
that will inform the waste management strategy, rely on the production of social reality 
through ethno-methods involving reflexivity, indexicality and inconcludability: three 
important constructs in ethnomethodological thought.  
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Who are the ‘strategists’ and what are their practices? In this setting, the definition of the 
strategist is broad and includes anyone and everyone involved in the production of accounts 
that constitute the strategy: the Government officials involved in setting up carbon credit 
trading markets, the senior managers responsible for the strategic plan, and Dan, the 
researcher who was out at 5am in the freezing rain with the “bin men” (as they are known 
locally) surveying recycling boxes. It is these many and varied ‘ethno-methods’ that make up 
what strategists treat as the ‘reality’ of the strategy environment that then constitute the 
politics of strategizing. Should the authority invest in bigger recycling boxes and more regular 
collections? Or should they instead launch an educational campaign to make households 
recycle more and sort their waste better? Or should they scale back recycling facilities and 
just purchase carbon credits instead? The answers that the strategists come up with would 
have, and did have, material consequences for society and the natural environment. 
Ethnomethodology is not a ‘grand’ sociological theory, interested in explaining social order 
through reference to those who stand to gain the most from the prevailing order of things. 
Power is not the ‘explanatory variable’ in ethnomethodological analysis. Rather, through the 
detailed explication of how accounts are made and whose account comes to dominate in the 
strategy process, it can shed light on how forms of inequality, exclusion and domination come 
about from the ‘common-sense’ reasoning of those involved.  
Karl Weick (1936- present) 
Karl Weick is widely recognised as one of the most prominent writers on organizations (Brown 
et al, 2008, 2015; Colville et al, 2012; Sutcliffe et al, 2006). Most commonly associated with 
his theory of organizing (Weick 1979) and the concept of sensemaking (Weick, 1995), Weick’s 
work has had a profound effect on the study of organizations. Weick’s ideas have also been 
influential in the world of practice, most notably through his impact on Tom Peters and Robert 
Waterman (Freedman, 2013), the popular management writers associated with the best-
selling In Search of Excellence (Peters and Waterman, 1982). Sensemaking is best 
characterised as a means of understanding the creation of the social world through the twin 
processes of interpretation and meaning production. The point is not that the world is ‘out 
there’ but rather that it is actively enacted by social actors when their beliefs about reality 
produce that reality. Weick’s work has many connections with Garfinkel. Garfinkel’s classic 
studies and his enquiries into the documentary method of interpretation, a concept first 
developed by Mannheim and Schutz, were both central to Weick’s work on sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995: 51). However, Weick approaches the question of sensemaking from his own 
disciplinary base in social psychology rather than sociology.  
In this special issue, Andrew Brown explores the implications of using Karl Weick’s theory of 
sensemaking to further our understanding of strategy. Through his close reading of Mike 
Martin’s (2014) book, An Intimate War, the author’s analysis of the American and British 
military campaign in Afghanistan, Brown demonstrates how the failure of the military strategy 
was grounded in an underlying failure of sensemaking. Brown’s analysis shows how the 
American and British military plan failed to make sense of the history, context and people of 
Afghanistan. The sensemaking failures were catastrophic for the people affected. In 
particular, a crucial error was made by the American and British military strategists who failed 
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to make sense of the nature and relevance of the established tribal groupings of the region. 
The corollary was an exacerbation of ethnic conflict. They failed to make sense of the 
economic importance of the opium trade for local farmers, pushing some into collusion with 
the Taliban for protection of the trade routes while pushing others into poverty. They failed 
to make sense of the inter-tribal divisions that undermined their attempts to install a 
democratic government. Bounty payments for those bringing in Taliban members led to 
innocent people being surrendered. Infrastructure investments were squandered and paid as 
bribes. In a bitter irony, those wrongly labelled as ‘Taliban’ often had little choice but to 
actually join the loose coalition so labelled by the West: left as they were with no aid money, 
terrorized by Government-backed ‘militias’ and with their poppy fields under threat. 
The military campaign left countless civilians dead and a country still riven with conflict and 
an economy still dependent on the opium trade. The dominant narrative (erroneously) used 
to make sense of the war, that of an ‘insurgency’ of illegitimate terrorists acting against a 
legitimate Government, ‘stuck’ throughout the planning and the campaign itself. It was the 
‘stickiness’ of the dominant narrative that led to a failure to make sense – and act – 
differently. Strong and unwavering commitment to a single master frame used in the West 
led to ‘blind spots’ in the military strategy pursued by the Americans and British. Failures were 
explained away as aberrations or side-effects rather than an opportunity to form a different 
‘pattern’ – a concept underlying both Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology and Weick’s 
sensemaking theory –  that would question the underlying assumptions of the strategy. The 
dominant narrative and master frame de-sensitized actorsfrom noticing cues that could have 
questioned what they took to be reality. Confirmation bias ruled. For example, tribal leaders 
trusted to provide information about the location of the Taliban were not subject to scrutiny. 
The idea that their ‘intelligence information’ was false, serving as a pretext for getting 
Western forces to back their tribal feud and regain territory or inflict revenge on rival clans, 
was never entertained. The links to Goffman’s work on fabrications is also relevant here. So 
attached were they to their master narratives, the Western forces failed to find alternative 
frames that would take a more sceptical approach to the ‘information’ they were provided. 
The tactics used by Afghans to undermine and exploit the cultural ignorance of the Western 
forces could easily have made it as an entry into Goffman’s (1969) book Strategic Interaction, 
based on his insights into the world of espionage, had Goffman been alive today. 
What can this tell us about strategizing? To strategize is to make sense: to piece together all 
the cues into a coherent pattern or ‘frame’ that we use to construct plausible explanations of 
what is happening, where we should go and what we should do. As Brown puts it, strategy is 
the ‘locally plausible sensemaking narrative’ about the organization’s future. That 
organization could be a firm, a hospital, a church, a political party or an ‘organized instrument 
of violence’ such as the military in this case. Failure in strategizing, then, can be directly linked 
to failure in sensemaking. The people the American and British military strategists should 
have been talking to and seeking to understand – the people of Afghanistan and their tribal 
leaders – were notably absent from the strategizing that took place in the military hierarchy. 
The ‘pattern’ or ‘frame’ associated with practices of war developed for other types of military 
campaign, with one coherent and collective ‘enemy’, were never questioned. And so the 
spiral of restricted sensemaking and the cycle of tribal conflict, poverty and violence 
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intensified – a process reminiscent of the escalation of commitment to an initial frame 
outlined by Cornelissen, Mantere, & Vaara (2014) but on a considerably more vast and bloody 
scale.  
 
Michel Foucault – 1926-1984 
Althusser, Baudrillard, Cixous, Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard form a 
generation of French thinkers and philosophers who are celebrated and reviled in equal 
measure. Whatever one’s view, the profound influence they have played in shaping 
contemporary social science is beyond doubt. Arguably, Michel Foucault stands at the fore of 
this group: his extraordinary body of work continues to have a far-reaching impact across the 
social sciences. Over thirty years since his death, Foucault remains as relevant and significant 
as when his lectures at the College de France first tantalised, beguiled and shaped a 
generation of researchers. Perhaps strangely, Foucault found a congenial home within 
European Business Schools (Carter, 2008). Most notably, his ideas have provided some of the 
major intellectual building blocks of both critical management studies (Knights and Morgan, 
1991; Knights and Willmott 1989; McKinlay and Starkey, 1997) and interdisciplinary 
accounting (Kurunmaki and Miller, 2013; Mennicken and Miller, 2012; Miller and O’Leary, 
1987). In recent years, articles adopting a broadly critical perspective on strategy have 
embraced Foucaultian thought (Carter and McKinlay, 2013; Dick and Collings, 2013; Ezzamel 
and Willmott, 2004; Hardy and Thomas, 2014; Kurunmaki and Miller, 2013; Macabe 2010, 
2016; McKinlay et al. 2010, 2012; Munro, 2014).  
In this Special Issue, Alan McKinlay and Eric Pezet further this conversation. They explore the 
implications for strategy of Foucault’s work on governmentality. Their paper is enigmatic and 
challenging. This can be seen in the opening passages of their paper where McKinlay and 
Pezet note that while Foucault wrote little about strategy as we currently conceive it, strategy 
was in fact central to his conceptualisation of power. McKinlay and Pezet depart from the 
well-trodden strategic paths, journeying into unfamiliar territory. Their first destination is the 
conception of agency. Agency is a difficult terrain for strategy. While much of strategy writing 
– both critical as well as mainstream – is invested with heroic assumptions about human 
agency, in particular the fantasy of the all-powerful transformational CEO, economics-based 
treatments of strategy struggle with the concept. For instance, Michael Porter’s 
conceptualisation of strategy affords prominence to industry attractiveness, rather than the 
skill of strategists. At best, the agency of the strategist is reduced to the ability to spot 
attractive industries and move into them before others do. Similarly, agency has been the 
source of a psychodrama for institutional theory as it slaloms between institutional 
entrepreneurship and embedded agency. While institutional theory generally demonstrates 
an adeptness at handling concepts, its struggle with agency is a serious limitation, one we 
speculate will ultimately undermine the viability of the approach. It is entirely possible and 
somewhat ironic that the neo-institutionalists will one day find their solutions in the works of 
Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. It will be a case of trudging back 35 years to advance 
into the 2020s (Burrell and Reed, 2018). Strategy as practice is more up-front about the 
importance of the agency of the strategist. McKinlay and Pezet remind us that, at face value, 
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agency runs counter to a Foucaultian approach, which is broadly disinterested in agency. They 
go further by announcing the ‘death of the strategist’, a riff on the ‘death of the author’ thesis. 
The master strategist plays no part in a governmentality perspective. 
What, then, does Foucault offer strategy? If questions of ‘why’ and ‘by whom’ fade into 
insignificance, McKinlay and Pezet suggest that a Foucaultian emphasis focuses on how 
strategy unfolds.  This is borne from the central premise of governmentality, namely exploring  
how specific techniques function and the effects of these techniques therein (Miller & Rose, 
2008). This changes the focus from ‘who governs’ – such as strategists or executives in an 
organization – to what “governmental rationalities” (Flyvberg, 1998: 273) are being used to 
govern? This distinction is crucial as it locates strategy at the level of vocabulary and 
rationality. As such, the key questions for the analysis of strategy becomes: ‘what makes a 
particular strategy thinkable?; what are its key terms?; what is the specific set of relationships 
that are targeted; what are mechanisms that are necessary to its deployment?’ (McKinlay and 
Pezet, 2018)In short, a Foucaultian approach to strategy places emphasis on how strategy is 
exercised. It is about how a technique such as a strategic planning cycle or a strategy 
workshop operates and what its effects are.  
The central assumption underpinning a Foucaultian approach to strategy is that strategy is 
always local in form but draws from broader global logics, discourses and techniques. There 
are, therefore, broad discourses that get appropriated locally in different ways. The 
implication, for McKinlay and Pezet, is that strategy involves not so much an act of creativity 
or innovation so much as curation. This is a new figuration for the strategist – that of curator.  
To understand a specific strategy therefore involves much more than the consideration of the 
means-ends thinking of a particular elite, of whatever kind. A Foucaultian approach to 
strategy highlights how strategy has become ubiquitous. Through this omnipresence, it is now 
unremarkable. In other words, we expect organizations to have strategies and we are 
comfortable with groups of people – whether they are consultants, CEOs, spin-doctors, 
political advisors – doing strategy. In fact, we are surprised when we enter an organization 
that does not have strategists and does not engage in strategizing. While strategy dons the 
cloak of neutrality and objectivity, it is a technology that produces power effects. There are 
winners and losers.  As Gendron (2018) aptly observes, ‘the overarching “plan” is to make 
sure that our mentality is that of local strategists, who will play and find pleasure in playing 
by the market’s rules. When this occurs, neoliberalism prevails. The “construction” of the 
strategizing individual, supported with a body of strategizing practices/knowledge, is a 
significant stake/step in the neoliberalization of the world’. The very commonplace nature of 
strategy has turned strategy on its head: while there is the death of the master strategist, in 
their place we are all strategists now. The ‘rationality’ of strategy and the techniques that 
accompany it – plans, forecasts, budgets, scenarios, and so on – are regarded as the ‘natural’ 
way to govern all aspects of our lives and our society.  
 
Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Felix Guattari (1930-1992) 
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Iain Munro and Torkild Thanem draw inspiration from the work of Deleuze and Guattari to 
understand strategic practice under contemporary capitalism and, most importantly, to make 
strategy ‘critical’ by understanding the forces of resistance that may be mobilized to disrupt 
the power of capitalist strategists. The authors take three examples of contemporary forms 
of resistance to capitalist modes of appropriation - the media industry, the music industry, 
and the Occupy movement - to illustrate the power of the concepts of deterritorialization, 
nomadism and the creation of smooth spaces. The latter concept requires some explanation. 
Munro and Jordan (2013: 1501) alert us to how space is ‘something that is fundamentally 
transformed by the way in which it is occupied’.  Deleuze and Guattari draw a distinction 
between smooth space and striatic space. Striatic space is readily understandable about how 
modern societies deal with and engage with space. Space can be mapped, measured and 
quantified. Striatic space is manageable. In contrast, a smooth space is one which does not 
attempt to partition territory or prohibit free movement. In this way it is counter to how space 
has been treated since the advent of agriculture and, more recently, the creation of modern 
states. Smooth spaces ‘tend to be difficult to map and to regulate, such as open spaces of the 
sea, the desert and the steppeʼ (Munro & Jordan, 2013: 1502). Such spaces are populated by 
figurations such as the nomad, the itinerant, the slum-dweller. 
 
The deterritorialization (or ‘movement away from a territory’) of the traditional media is the 
first example. Internet and social media platforms have transformed journalistic practices in 
ways that escape the control of traditional news media firms. Citizen journalism through sites 
such as WikiLeaks act not only as whistleblowing platforms but also as sources of intelligence 
and activism for a range of social actors shut out or silenced by traditional media. WikiLeaks’ 
strategy has been to create a ‘smooth space’ without attempts to divert or direct the flow of 
information exchange. WikiLeaks can be understood from this perspective as a ‘nomadic war 
machine’, creating its own deterritorialized smooth spaces which cut across the boundaries 
set by both nation-states and the international governance system as well as media 
corporations, generating news in ways that subvert the organization of production and 
distribution in traditional media corporations.   The role of social media has undoubtedly had 
far-reaching effects. Certainly, it has lessened the effects of traditional news organizations. 
For instance, in the 2017 British General Election, the right-wing press in the UK ran a strong 
campaign against Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the British Labour Party. In previous elections, 
labour leaders such as Michael Foot (1983), Neil Kinnock (1978 & 1992), Gordon Brown (2010) 
and Ed Miliband (2015) had been subject to similar campaigns. The difference in 2017 is that 
it had less of an effect (Iszatt White et al, 2018), largely because of the countervailing effect 
of social media. While progressives applaud the lessening of the grip of traditional media 
moguls, it opens up two questions: (i) while it is easy to get carried away with the progressive 
potential of new technology and social movements, are its effects overstated when it comes 
into conflict with prevailing power structures? (ii) to what extent can reactionary forces 
mobilise new technologies against progressive social movements?   
The deterritorialization of the music industry provides the second example. With the rise of 
file sharing technology came a radical shift in the centralised control of music production and 
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consumption previously enjoyed by the industry. Since the launch of Napster and the many 
music sharing sites that have followed, these open platforms have deterritorialized music 
production and distribution, despite the attempts of media giants to reign in such 
‘information nomadism’ (Munro, 2010). Porter’s (2001) vision of strategy following the 
internet revolution, with its emphasis on the ‘business as usual’ of large corporations 
maintaining their strategic advantage by maintaining barriers to entry, could not have been 
more misguided it seems. Confined by his view of the ‘rightful place’ of corporations in 
producing commodities for us to consume, extracting their surplus in the process, Porter 
failed to appreciate the disruptive potential of actors not driven by capitalist logics (as the 
case in peer-to-peer sharing and open source programming) seeking to share information 
commodities that do not diminish when they are consumed. These new forms of production, 
distribution and consumption evade exploitation by traditional corporations, despite their 
attempts to curb them through legal action and copyright laws.  
The third and final example is the Occupy movement. With no formal structures, no party 
machinery, no leaders and open communication flows, the Occupy movement is a 
combination of a physical smooth space in the encampments and a virtual smooth space on 
the Internet. The non-hierarchical and heterogeneous make-up of the Occupy movement 
deterritorializes conventional notions of political protest and resistance such as the Marxist 
notion of ‘class struggle’.  As Barthold et al. (2017:8) put it, ‘OWS, and the wider Occupy 
movement which it sparked, can be considered as practising an itinerant politics. The 
movement, through its horizontality and its leaderless practice, refused hierarchies. Instead, 
power and leadership roles circulated’. But it is also more than a political protest. The Occupy 
movement creates economic and political value that exceeds and subverts both capitalist 
markets and the State-parliamentary regulation of political will. For Munro and Thanem, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of strategy against capitalism, rather than strategies 
pursued by firms, works through the concepts of nomadism, movement in smooth spaces, 
and the capacity to deterritorialize. Nomadism is the strategy of resistance aimed at an 
‘absolute deterritorialization’ that cannot be exploited by capital or captured by the capitalist 
State. The ‘nomadic war machine’ described by Deleuze and Guattari refers to the subversive 
groups who turn ‘striated’ spaces of capital into smooth space, who deterritorialize desire 
and affect, and who challenge the powers of the capitalist State and the corporations it 
supports. Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy also brings a new range of people into the 
strategy scene: citizens who create their own news, peers who share their files through the 
internet, political activists who create their own community of resistance and protest without 
leaders or political parties. Of course, acts of deterritorialization and nomadism are always 
subject to countervailing strategies of territorialization and the strategies pursued against 
capitalism are met with forces to reassert its control. At the point of writing, large 
corporations seem to exercise a continued grip on the production of news and music and the 
Occupy movement is in danger of being forgotten. However, through Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy, we are given new ways of understanding the politics of strategy: the practices of 
commodification and control exercised by corporations and the ways of escaping the 
exploitation of human desire by capital. Of course, such enthusiasm for the progressive 
possibilities of such movements are often short-lived. Matthews (2018: 140) highlights the 
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limitations of the Occupy movement in London, which was a high profile and fascinating social 
movement protesting against the excesses of the bankers, exposed by the banking crash: 
‘ultimately Occupy London stalled in that moment of home, and in the identity of the 
occupation camp, which represented a terminal moment. In this sense, Occupy London was 
an important but initial moment of critique, which was ultimately unable to extend itself into 
a more enduring threat’.  
 
Slavoj Zizek (1949-present) 
Slavoj Zizek is the self-styled rock star of European philosophy. Described as the Elvis of 
philosophy (Bainbridge, 2016), Zizek’s work has electrified continental philosophy, although 
his influence within the Business School world remains somewhat more marginal. Zizek has 
maintained a high-profile media presence, including regular contributions to many English 
language periodicals, public lectures to packed audiences and the production of films, 
combined with prolific academic publishing covering a dazzling myriad of different subjects. 
Zizek is provocative and beguiling in equal measure; two properties that set him apart from 
the entirety of the canon of mainstream strategy but should commend him to critical scholars. 
It is in this spirit that critical management scholar Nick Butler (2018) interrogates the 
implications of Zizek’s work for strategy.   
Butler situates Zizek’s work in two traditions: Hegelian-Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
Butler highlights how these literatures are read in tension with one another by Zizek. Such 
intellectual currents are far removed from the prevailing trade-winds of strategy theorizing. 
Stylistically, Zizek has embraced a punk rock aesthetic that manifests itself in a propensity to 
make statements that are shocking, outrageous and counter intuitive. Yet behind the ‘shock 
factor’ lies the interrogation of a complex paradox, or a playful inversion of the taken for 
granted. Following an introduction of Zizek’s oeuvre, Butler focuses on two concepts that 
have relevance for strategy: the ‘point de capiton’ and the ‘object petit a’1.  
The point de capiton is a term taken from Zizek’s reading of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The term 
in French roughly translates as ‘upholstery button’, a metaphor for the points at which the 
signifier and signified are ‘anchored’ or ‘knotted’ together to fix and stabilise them, in the 
same way as the buttons on a quilt keep the otherwise shapeless stuffing from moving about. 
Turning to the world of strategy, then, if we seek to know what activities comprise strategy 
in the strategy as practice (SAP) literature, Butler points out it is underpinned by a strange 
tautology: ‘strategy is strategy’. Rather than being a weakness or oversight on the part of SAP 
theorists, Butler argues, ‘It alerts us to the fact that the term ‘strategy’ functions as a point de 
capiton’. What Butler is suggesting is that the relationship between the signifier and the 
signified is precarious: thus the relationship between the signifier (the word strategy) and the 
signified (what the word strategy is supposed to signify or refer to) is often arbitrary and 
                                                          
1 Zizek draws these concepts from Jacques Lacan. For the purposes of clarity, the objet petit a needs to be 
understood in terms of Lacan’s theorisation of desire. Lacan argues that the ‘object of desire’ is perpetually 
deferred and asserts that we will never have what we desire. Lacan draws a distinction between ‘needs’ and 
‘desire’, arguing that people can attain what they need but not what they desire. 
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unclear. In this schema, the point de capiton serves as a ‘quilting’ or ‘anchoring’ point, 
providing ‘imaginary identification’ between the signifier and the signified. Whatever they 
happen to be studying – managers talking in a corridor, consultants analyzing numbers in a 
spreadsheet, Powerpoint presentations in a corporate boardroom – SAP ‘anchors’ this activity 
to the signifier ‘strategy’. 
This ‘anchoring’ is not simply about meaning-making: a moment where the endless 
movement of signs in the systems of signification can be halted. It also has an ideological 
underpinning and import. For Zizek, the point de capiton also involves a process whereby 
individuals recognize themselves as certain types of subjects by this fixing and stabilizing of 
meaning around the signifier (e.g. the good citizen, the obedient child, the shrewd strategist, 
the creative thinker), an idea that connects back to Althusser’s concept of interpellation as 
ideological identification. However, for Zizek, this identification is characterised not by its 
success and completeness but by its failure and the persistence of lack. This concept of 
pleasure, enjoyment and desire is important in the notion of objet petit a, a concept first 
developed by Lacan and then taken up by Zizek. Objet petit a roughly translates as the ‘lost 
object’2, very simply it refers an object of desire that can never be realised. The  object of 
desire is something that people fantasize about, often unconsciously, but ultimately can never 
fully know, grasp or attain. It is this very unattainability, the thing that we are fundamentally 
lacking, that generates its appeal and sparks our desire. The object petit a is a ‘cause of desire, 
is an expression of the lack inherent in human beings, whose incompleteness and early 
helplessness produce a quest for fulfillment beyond the satisfaction of physical needs’ 
(Kirshner, 2004: 101). The objet petit a both expresses the lack or void at the same time as it 
masks it by filling it with something that can never be obtained and is ultimately illusory, 
which is why Lacan views the fantasy object as both the cause and effect of desire. It is also 
fundamentally ideological in nature because it serves the political function of creating 
‘sublime’ objects (such as democracy, freedom, unity, etc.) that its subjects desire and that 
serve to justify all acts in its name (the creation of “The Jew” as an object of hatred and the 
fantasy of the ‘pure and perfect’ nation in Nazi ideology is one such example). If the 
entrepreneur is a sublime object in Jones and Spicer’s (2005) analysis, then strategy is the 
sublime object not only for SAP but for all subjects caught up in the discourse of strategy. 
Strategy, then, becomes a ‘cause of desire’ for managers, executives, business school 
students and so on. The fact that SAP produces tautological definitions of strategy (‘strategy’ 
is ‘strategy’) is therefore not evidence of conceptual sloppiness or a lack of precise 
instruments for measuring the ‘properties’ of strategy. Rather, it is evidence that strategy acts 
as a point de capiton, in the same way as Socialism operates in Zizek’s analysis. The same 
holds true of the search for ‘the strategist’ within SAP. Rather than seek a tighter definition 
of who ‘really is’ a strategist or whose work ‘really does’ have strategic import, the point is to 
understand how potentially any subject (a manager, a salesperson, a supplier, a customer) is 
able to ‘inhabit the empty place in the symbolic network to the extent that they are ‘pinned’ 
to the master-signifier’ (Butler, 2018)  that is ‘strategy’. And crucially, those doing this 
‘pinning’ include not only the people that we study but also the SAP scholars who are writing 
                                                          
2 Lacan was however against any attempts at translation and insisted on the original term being used. 
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about them. It is the SAP theorists, then, who are engaged in this ‘constant effort to grasp 
something that remains – necessarily – forever beyond their grasp and which, for this very 
reason, exerts a powerful allure’ (Butler, 2018), while at the same time obscuring the traces 
of their own ‘fixing’ of meaning.  
Butler proceeds to argue that the other major implication of Zizek’s arguments for strategic 
thought is to consider how an intervention can disrupt ideology and break with the existing 
symbolic order. In this reading of strategy, focus gets placed on an event that offers a 
challenge or break with an existing symbolic order. Butler reprises Zizek’s discussion of the 
dispute between General Tito, president of the Yugoslav republic, and Joseph Stalin, head of 
the Soviet Union. Tito refused Stalin’s demands, which led to a break between Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Bloc. The central point is the ‘arresting statement’, when Tito exclaimed ‘No!’, 
which is a forceful gesture of refusal. This break short-circuited the social relations that 
defined them as communists. Strategy for Zizek would entail examining examples that lead 
to a break – however fleetingly - with an existing order.  This would resonate with 
revolutionary strategy from below (Friedland, 2013), where the key is to understanding a 
revolutionary moment. Butler evinces that sudden ruptures challenge an organization’s 
ability to function. These radical breaks are moments of freedom in which the routinized and 
habitual ideological functioning of organizations is disrupted. 
 
Moving Forward 
We started this essay by asserting the importance of strategy. Strategy is far from being a 
mere buzzword word that is little more than a delusional act to patch over managerial futility. 
Strategy matters. Strategy done well can improve the lot of an organization and society, 
conversely done badly it can have ruinous consequences. This insight applies to companies, 
professional service firms, NGOs, political parties and governments alike. Ten years on from 
the collapse of many of the world’s financial institutions, the far-reaching effects of strategy 
done badly, or rather more precisely a ‘bad’ strategy from the perspective of society that was 
executed rather well from the perspective of the elites, is all too clear. If the broadly applied 
strategy of de-regulation ushered in the conditions of possibility for the great financial crash, 
it was the strategies pursued by many of the major banks that transmogrified this possibility 
into a reality. A heady mix of hubris, functional stupidity, automation of the assumptions built 
into algorithms, normalization of deviance and misunderstanding of risk saw the banks drown 
in an ocean of debt. Curiously it was government action that saved neo-liberalism from itself. 
A hastily arranged strategy of state intervention on a scale not seen in peacetime, saw the 
banks recapitalized and the financial system stabilised. Curiously, in spite of colossal strategic 
failure, bankers were reluctant to acknowledge their role in creating the crisis and instead 
were keen to return to business-as-usual as soon as possible. Many countries had now 
incurred large scale sovereign debts as a result of the rescue of the banks. This led to some 
governments then launch strategies of austerity to reduce the debts. Thus, those who had 
created the crash – the bankers and their auditors and advisors – had amassed considerable 
private wealth, while the victims became those reliant on state benefits and services, which 
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were cut dramatically. What we see are multiple strategies playing off each other with 
dramatic consequences.    
Earlier in this paper, we talked about the dominant schools of thought in strategic 
management. MBAs are taught that they are either ‘with’ Porter or the Resource Based View. 
A new kid on the block, strategy as practice, has also laid claim to being the new school of 
thought. We hope that another school can also be considered, one that takes a critical view 
and understands strategy as a social and political practice. What we call for is a multi-
paradigmatic and politically progressive conversation about how to work out a critical 
approach to strategy. In light of its importance, we argue that no singular perspective can 
hope to provide a comprehensive view of the importance of strategy. Reducing the world of 
strategy down to five strategic ‘forces’ or semi-mystical ‘resources’ is to the miss the point of 
strategy completely.  
The world is changing. 2016 will almost certainly be counted as one of the most dramatic 
years in modern times, on a par with 1989 or 1968. The Brexit vote in the UK, the election of 
Donald Trump to the American presidency, and the on-going refugee crisis are symptoms of 
broader problems within society. Inequality breeds populism which can take societies to very 
dangerous places. Strategy scholarship must step up. The Overton window of strategy must 
be shattered: it is simply not enough to trot out clichés about market structures and dynamic 
capabilities. Nor is it enough to dwell on mundane practices that to non-academics might 
seem whimsical and self-indulgent, a little delight for some workshop or other aimed at 
publishing in some ‘A’ grade journal or other. If strategy scholarship is to count, it must engage 
with the rich resources of intellectual thought emanating from the social sciences over the 
past half century. These ideas have much to offer strategy. 
Table 1 below offers a comparison of the perspectives covered in this issue, starting with the 
key concepts associated with the theorist and detailing the setting in which it is explored in 
each paper. The table then highlights “three P’s” from each theorist: the people involved in 
making strategy, the types of practices each perspective associates with strategy, and finally 
how the perspective addresses questions of politics.  
   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 illustrates the implications of each of the theorists profiled in this issue. The broader 
point is that each of the theorists has the potential to take us to a different place in our 
conceptualisation of strategy. If we return to the banking crash of 2007-2008 and think 
through what the implications of each of the theorists profiled in this issue for understanding 
the crisis.  If we follow Goffman, for instance, we become intensely interested in the 
performance of strategy and, in particular, how some performances are deemed convincing 
and credible and thus ‘strategic’. How was it that banks managed to convince regulators and 
auditors that their strategies of risk were sustainable? How was it that they were able to style 
themselves as ‘Masters of the Universe’ and producers of wealth in society? Most of us were 
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‘duped’ and few saw through their artful presentations. Strategy from a Garfinkel frame takes 
us to a place where we can ask how strategists use their common sense knowledge to produce 
accounts that constitute the ‘facts’ they work with in compiling their reports, presentations, 
forecasts and plans. How did the banks generate what seemed at the time as ‘common sense’ 
ways of maximizing returns by playing ‘casino capitalism’ with our money? Banks had, it 
seemed, created new products which re-wrote the ‘laws of finance’. How was this so? Weick’s 
master concept of sensemaking invites us to consider how strategists understand their world 
and crucially how they enact these assumptions through their strategizing. How did the banks 
take their master frame of ‘too big to fail’ and use it to enact such strategies of risk? How 
were the banks about to make sense of themselves as clever, smart and doing a good job for 
so long? For Foucault, strategy invites us to identify how strategy techniques work and how 
their power effects are felt in organizations and society. How did the techniques of governing 
ushered in with deregulation set up the conditions of possibility for the crash? Deleuze and 
Guattari lead us to try to understand strategies of resistance that involve deterritorialization 
and the creation of smooth spaces. Certainly, the banks were involved in processes of 
deterritorialization, with capital moving in new and unusual ways. A Deleuze and Guattari 
perspective would possibly be puzzled at how little resistance – outside of G8 protests and 
indignant cries from the far left of politics– occurred during the boom. Studying contemporary 
resistance would almost certainly involve highlighting the role of social media in the process 
of deterritorializing.  The strategy of capital, with its colonization of territory necessary for 
exploitation, meets the nomad who rejects territorialization. Again, the rejection was 
marginal, only could perhaps be found in initiatives such as local currencies or local exchange 
trading systems. Of greatest note, is following the collapse of the banks, the nation state in 
numerous countries asserted itself by intervening in a crisis. This followed decades where the 
limits or decline of the nation state had been widely asserted. What we saw was state 
intervention on a colossal scale that shored up the economic system. Finally, Zizek invites us 
to consider strategy as an object of desire in organizations, where such desire is essential for 
the working of ideology. This tells us much about how executives within the banks ‘object of 
desire’ of being the biggest, richest and most powerful financial institutions also proved 
elusive. This prompted larger takeovers, more exotic financial instruments as the executives 
tried to live out their fantasies. No amount of profit was ever enough. Zizek can help us 
understand why such financial excesses were pursued. 
Embracing these new perspectives entails not only providing different answers to existing 
questions being asked in the field of strategic management. It also involves asking different 
questions altogether: How do organizations come to conceive of their direction, purpose and 
goals through the frames and narratives they use to make sense? How do actors produce 
performances recognised as ‘strategic’? How do strategic techniques and bodies of 
knowledge render the world calculable and governable? How do actors seek to resist the 
territorialisation of spaces by capital and reclaim spaces and flows of information? What are 
the ideological causes, and consequences, of the strategies that are pursued and the very 
signifier ‘strategy’ itself?   
One of the central lessons of organization theory is that its strength comes from being multi-
paradigmatic and polyphonic. Using different and sometimes complex ideas to understand a 
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phenomenon undoubtedly helps us to make sense of it in richer ways. This is not a one-way 
street of social scientific thought being imported into the strategic management community 
to help with working out functional problems of competitive advantage. If strategic thought 
is to matter within the social sciences then it also needs to be able to offer a compelling 
explanation of society’s challenges and problems (Carter, 2013). Only by understanding the 
problem is it possible to conceive of solutions. This special issue maintains that using social 
theory can help understand strategy as a cultural, organizational and political phenomenon. 
Strategy is as much about ‘strategy from below’ – the activities of social movements and 
political parties – as it is about ‘strategy from above’ – the preserve of boardrooms, cabinet 
offices and the corridors of power. Strategy also suggests that we have agency in the world 
that we create: globalization was not an unstoppable juggernaut (Giddens, 1999), nor was the 
financial crisis, both were actively created and sustained by human agency. This special issue 
will have succeeded if it opens up a conversation about the future of studying and teaching 
strategy. It is a future that must be plural and progressive. It must also seek to overcome the 
dominance of those who are white and male, recognising that this special issue has 
reproduced this very issue, and strive to write gender, race and other forms of inequality and 
difference into the study of strategy.  
We began this editorial by using the metaphor of an archipelago to describe the academic 
field of strategy. Business School strategy needs to build some bridges and become far more 
linked up to islands of critical thought. It is for this reason that we have published this 
collection of essays in Critical Perspectives on Accounting. The journal has shown a consistent 
commitment to publishing progressive and critical research3.  Indeed, accounting is no 
stranger to strategy, with the Big Four accounting firms being providers of strategy 
consultancy. Stylized strategy tools such as the ‘balance scorecard’ have their origins within 
accounting. We assert that strategy is a topic that is of as much a concern for accounting 
scholars as risk management, valuation or integrated reporting. We end this Special Issue with 
an injunction: strategy is too important to be left to be studied by those who only seek 
functionalist answers to managerialist questions of competitive advantage. It must be part of 
a broader conversation that we hope many critical thinkers will want to join in.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful to Christine Cooper and Yves Gendron, CPA editors, for their very 
careful reading of this editorial and their insightful commentary. We would also like to 
acknowledge their generosity and support throughout this process, which has greatly 
enhanced the scope and ambition of the Special Issue. The articles contained in this issue 
have their origins in the ‘24 hours on Strategy workshop’, hosted by the Strategy, 
Organizations and Society (SOS) Group at Newcastle University Business School. Founded in 
2011, the SOS group has been an important forum for the development of critical scholarship 
in the field of strategy and organizations. We acknowledge the generous support of Newcastle 
                                                          
3 Arguably there are two journals, Critical Perspectives on Accounting and Organization, that have consistently 
published critical scholarship in the respective fields of accounting and organization theory. 
23 
 
University Business School in hosting the event. Many reviewers gave their time generously 
in support of this project. We thank them.  
 
References 
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. (1962). Two Faces of Power. American Political Science Review. 
56 (4), 947-952. 
Balogun, J., Jacobs, C., Jarzabkowski, P., Mantere, S., & Vaara, E. (2014). Placing strategy 
discourse in context: Sociomateriality, sensemaking, and power. Journal of Management 
Studies, 51(2), 175-201. 
Bainbridge, C. (2016) The Elvis of Philosophy?  Philosophy Now. Issue 114. 
https://philosophynow.org/issues/114/Slavoj_Zizek_-_The_Elvis_of_Philosophy Accessed: 
20th December, 2017. 
Barthold, C., Dunne, S., and Harvie, D. (2017). Resisting financialisation with Deleuze and 
Guattari: the case of Occupy Wall Street. Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 
Beck, G. (2010). The Overton Window. Simon and Schuster. 
Boedker, C. (2010) Ostensive versus performative approaches for theorising accounting-
strategy research. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 23 (5): 595-625. 
Brown, A.D. (2018) Making Sense of the War in Afghanistan. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting. 
Brown, A. D., Stacey, P., & Nandhakumar, J. (2008). Making sense of sensemaking narratives. 
Human relations, 61(8), 1035-1062. 
Brown, A. D., Colville, I., & Pye, A. (2015). Making sense of sensemaking in organization 
studies. Organization Studies, 36(2), 265-277. 
Brown, A. D., & Thompson, E. R. (2013). A narrative approach to strategy-as-practice. Business 
History, 55(7), 1143-1167. 
Butler, N. (2018) Fantasies of strategy: Žižek, discourse and enjoyment. Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting. 
Carter, C. (2013). The Age of Strategy: Strategy, Organizations and Society. Business History.  
55 (7), 1046-1057 
Carter, C., Clegg, S., Kornberger, M. (2008a) Strategy as Practice? Strategic Organization, 6 
(1), 107-112. 
Carter, C., Clegg, S., Kornberger, M. (2008b) S-A-P: Zapping the Field. Strategic Organization, 
6 (1), 83-99. 
Carter, C. Clegg, S., Kornberger, M. (2008c) A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably 
Cheap Introduction to Studying Strategy. London: Sage. 
24 
 
Carter, C., Clegg, S., and Kornberger, M. (2010) Re-framing strategy: power, politics and 
accounting. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal. 23 (5), 573-594.  
Chapman, C., Chua, W-F, and Mahama, H. (2013), Actor-network theory and strategy as 
practice. In Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as Practice, Second edition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Chia, R., & MacKay, B. (2007). Post-processual challenges for the emerging strategy-as-
practice perspective: Discovering strategy in the logic of practice. Human Relations, 60(1), 
217-242. 
Clegg, S., Carter, C., Kornberger, M. and Schweitzer, J. (2011). Strategy: Theory and Practice. 
London: Sage. 
Colville, I., Brown, A. D., & Pye, A. (2012). Simplexity: Sensemaking, organizing and storytelling 
for our time. Human Relations, 65(1), 5-15. 
Cooper, C. (2015) Accounting for the fictitious: A Marxist contribution to understanding 
accounting's roles in the financial crisis. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 30, 63-82. 
Cornelissen, J. P., Mantere, S., & Vaara, E. (2014). The contraction of meaning: The combined 
effect of communication, emotions, and materiality on sensemaking in the Stockwell 
shooting. Journal of Management Studies, 51(5), 699-736. 
Dick, P., & Collings, D. G. (2014). Discipline and punish? Strategy discourse, senior manager 
subjectivity and contradictory power effects. Human Relations. 
Elliot, L. and Atkinson, D. (2009) The Gods That Failed: How the Financial Elite Have Gambled 
Away Our Futures. London: Vintage. 
Ezzamel, M., & Willmott, H. (2004). Rethinking strategy: contemporary perspectives and 
debates. European Management Review, 1(1), 43-48. 
Ezzamel, M., & Willmott, H. (2008). Strategy as discourse in a global retailer: A supplement to 
rationalist and interpretive accounts. Organization Studies, 29(2), 191-217. 
Ezzamel, M., & Willmott, H. (2010). Strategy and strategizing: A poststructuralist perspective. 
In The Globalization of Strategy Research (pp. 75-109). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Fenton, C., & Langley, A. (2011). Strategy as practice and the narrative turn. Organization 
studies, 32(9), 1171-1196. 
Freedman, L. (2013). Strategy: A history. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gendron, Y. (2018). Personal communication. 
Goffman, E. (1969). Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Golsorkhi, D., Rouleau, L., Seidl, D., & Vaara, E. (Eds.). (2010). Cambridge handbook of strategy 
as practice. Cambridge University Press. 
25 
 
Hardy, C., & Thomas, R. (2014). Strategy, discourse and practice: The intensification of 
power. Journal of Management Studies, 51(2), 320-348. 
Hendry, J., & Seidl, D. (2003). The structure and significance of strategic episodes: Social 
systems theory and the routine practices of strategic change. Journal of Management Studies, 
40(1), 175-196. 
Jarzabkowski, P. (2004). Strategy as practice: Recursiveness, adaptation, and practices-in-
use. Organization Studies, 25(4), 529-560. 
Jarzabkowski, P., Kaplan, S., Seidl, D., & Whittington, R. (2016). If you aren’t talking about 
practices, don’t call it a practice-based view: Rejoinder to Bromiley and Rau in Strategic 
Organization. Strategic Organization, 14(3), 270-274 
Jarzabkowski, P., Spee, A. P., & Smets, M. (2013). Material artifacts: Practices for doing 
strategy with ‘stuff’. European Management Journal, 31(1), 41-54. 
Jones, C., & Spicer, A. (2005). The sublime object of entrepreneurship. Organization, 12(2), 
223-246. 
Kelsey, D. (2017). The Discourse of Financial Crisis and Austerity: Critical Analyses of Business 
and Economics Across Disciplines. London: Routledge. 
Kerr, R. and Robinson, S. (2015) Architecture, symbolic capital and elite mobilizations: The 
case of the Royal Bank of Scotland corporate campus. Organization 23 (5). 699-721. 
Kirshner, L. (2004). Rethinking Desire: the objet petit a in Lacanian Theory. Journal of the 
American Psychoanalytical Association. 53 (1), 83-102. 
Kornberger, M. and Carter, C. (2010). Manufacturing Competition: how accounting practices 
shape strategy making in cities. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 23 (3), 325-
349. 
Kornberger, M., & Clegg, S. (2011). Strategy as performative practice: The case of Sydney 
2030. Strategic Organization, 9(2), 136-162. 
Kurunmaki, L. and Miller, P. (2013) Calculating failure: the making of a calculative 
infrastructure for forgiving and forecasting failure. Business History, 55 (7). 1100-1118 
Llewellyn, N., & Hindmarsh, J. (Eds.). (2010). Organisation, interaction and practice: Studies in 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mantere, S., & Vaara, E. (2008). On the problem of participation in strategy: A critical 
discursive perspective. Organization Science, 19(2), 341-358. 
Martin, I. (2013). Making It Happen: Fred Goodwin, RBS and the men who blew up the British 
economy. London: Simon and Schuster. 
Matthews, J. (2018) Occupation as refrain: territory and beyond in Occupy London, Social 
Movement Studies, 17:2, 127-143 
26 
 
McCabe, D. (2010). Strategy-as-power: Ambiguity, contradiction and the exercise of power in 
a UK building society. Organization, 17(2), 151-175. 
McCabe, D. (2016) Numericalizing the other: a critical analysis of a strategy discourse in a UK 
bank. Organization. 23 (4), 525-549 
McKinlay, A., Carter, C., Pezet, E. and Clegg, S. (2010) Using Foucault to Make Strategy. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal. 23(8), 1012-1031.  
McKinlay, A. & Pezet, E. (2018) Foucault, Governmentality, Strategy: from the ear of the 
sovereign to the multitude. Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 
Mennicken, A. and Miller, P.  (2012). Accounting, Territorialization and Power. Foucault 
Studies, 13, 4-24. 
Miller, P. and O’Leary, T. (1987). Accounting and the Construction of the Governable Person. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12, 3, 235-265. 
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (2008). Governing the present: Administering economic, social and 
personal life. London: Polity Press. 
Mueller, F. (2018) Taking Goffman Seriously: Developing Strategy-as-Practice. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting.  
Munro I.  (2014) Organizational Ethics and Foucault's 'Art of Living': Lessons from Social 
Movement Organizations. Organization Studies, 35(8), 1127-1148. 
Munro, I. and Jordan, S. (2013) ‘Living Space’ at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe: Spatial tactics  
and the politics of smooth space. Human Relations 
Munro, I. & Thanem, T. (2018) Deleuze and the Deterritorialization of Strategy, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting. 
Neyland, D. & Whittle, A. (2018) Garfinkel on Strategy: Using Ethnomethodology to Make 
Sense of “Rubbish Strategy”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 
Oswick, C., Fleming, P., & Hanlon, G. (2011). From borrowing to blending: Rethinking the 
processes of organizational theory building. Academy of Management Review, 36(2), 318-
337. 
Regnér, P. (2008). Strategy-as-practice and dynamic capabilities: Steps towards a dynamic 
view of strategy. Human Relations, 61(4), 565-588. 
Seidl, D., & Whittington, R. (2014). Enlarging the strategy-as-practice research agenda: 
Towards taller and flatter ontologies. Organization Studies, 35(10), 1407-1421. 
Spee, A. P., & Jarzabkowski, P. (2009). Strategy tools as boundary objects. 
Suddaby, R., Seidl, D., & Lê, J. K. (2013). Strategy-as-practice meets neo-institutional theory. 
Sutcliffe, K. M., Brown, A. D., & Putnam, L. L. (2006). Introduction to the special issue ‘Making 
sense of organizing: In honor of Karl Weick’. Organization Studies, 27(11), 1573-1578. 
27 
 
Vaara, E., & Whittington, R. (2012). Strategy-as-practice: taking social practices 
seriously. Academy of Management Annals, 6(1), 285-336. 
Weick, K. E. (1979). The social psychology of organizing (Topics in social psychology series). 
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations (Vol. 3). Sage. 
Whittington, R. (2014). Information systems strategy and strategy-as-practice: a joint 
agenda. The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 23(1), 87-91. 
Whittington, R. (2007), Strategy Practice and Strategy Process: Family Differences and the 
Sociological Eye, Organization Studies, Vol 28, Issue 10, pp. 1575 – 1586. 
Whittle, A and Mueller, F. (2010), Strategy, enrolment and accounting: the politics of strategic 

















Table 1: Social Theory and Strategy 
Paper Social Theory Key concepts Strategy Setting  People Practices Politics 
Mueller Goffman Performance, 
























organizational elites  
Image intensive 
presentations packaged as 
credible strategy 
Socio-economic 





























Writing of strategy documents 
Recycling league tables 
Trading of landfill credits 
Provision of recycling 
facilities 
Moral evaluation of 
citizens 
Carbon credit trading 





















Sensemaking about nature of 
‘enemy’ 
Enforced changes in GIRoA 
Government 
Military attacks on terrorist units 
presumed to exist 
Bounty payments 
Infrastructure investment squandered 
Intensification of ethnic 
violence 
Loss of civilian life 












disciplinary power  
 
Foucault’s reading 
of Machiavelli on 
strategy  




Any subjects who self-
define and self-
discipline according to 
the discourse of 
strategy 
Techniques and technologies of 
governance 
Categorisation and measurement 
systems 
Exercise of power in 
contemporary capitalism 




Deleuze Nomadic strategy, 
deterritorialization, 
smooth space 
Three cases: media, 
music industry and 






Citizen journalism (e.g. Wikileaks) 
Peer to peer sharing (e.g. Napster) 
Open source programming 
Political activism (e.g. Occupy Wall 
Street) 
Resistance to capital by 
reclaiming flows, spaces 
and production 
 
Butler Zizek Ideology, master-
signifier, objet petit a 
(paradoxical cause 
and effect of desire), 
fantasy, enjoyment, 






Speakers of the 
discourse of strategy 
Those ‘pinned’ to the 
master signifier 
‘strategist’ 
Practices of defining and enquiring 
about strategy 
New forms of ideology in 
late capitalist society 
 
 
